Martin Heidegger's Deconstruction of the History of Ontology

I 

Introduction

In the opening pages of his magnum opus, Being and Time, Martin Heidegger resurrects a question he argues has been buried for millennia, framing his entire project with an epigraph from Plato’s Sophist: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.” This is no mere academic exercise but a deliberate reawakening of what Heidegger argues is the most fundamental and, paradoxically, the most forgotten question in the history of Western thought. For Heidegger, a pervasive “forgetfulness of Being” has characterized philosophy since antiquity, where the initial, vibrant inquiry into what it means “to be” solidified into a series of unexamined dogmas. The question was not answered and then set aside; rather, it fell into obscurity, concealed by the very traditions that were supposed to preserve it.

This blog argues that Heidegger's critical "destruction" (Destruktion) of the history of ontology is not a nihilistic rejection of the past, but an indispensable philosophical method. Its purpose is to dismantle the inherited prejudices that have systematically obscured the question of Being, thereby preparing the ground for a fundamental ontology by exposing how the Western tradition, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, systematically reduced the meaning of Being to a static concept of presence or substance (ousia). To understand the necessity of this deconstructive task, we must first examine the formal structure of the question Heidegger seeks to revive.

II

The Formal Structure of the Question and its Priority

Before engaging with the historical tradition, Heidegger strategically lays out the formal structure of the question of Being. This analysis is crucial, for it demonstrates that the inquiry is not a vague or mystical puzzle but a rigorous philosophical problem with distinct, identifiable components. By clarifying what is being asked, what is sought, and which entity is being interrogated, Heidegger moves the question from the realm of the self-evident and obscure into the domain of phenomenological investigation. This formal clarity provides the very standard against which the failures of the tradition can be measured. Heidegger outlines three core structural components that constitute any genuine question, and specifically the question of Being, namely, Das Gefragte: This is that which is asked about the Being of entities. The inquiry is not aimed at any particular entity or category of entities (e.g., nature, history, language) but at Being itself, which makes any entity intelligible as an entity in the first place. Das Erfragte: This is that which is to be found out by the asking, the meaning of Being. The goal of the entire project is not simply to state that entities are, but to arrive at a conceptual understanding of what this "is" signifies. This meaning is the ultimate horizon sought by the inquiry. And Das Befragte: This is the entity which must be interrogated—Dasein. Heidegger identifies a particular entity that must be questioned to gain access to Being: the human being, or Dasein.

Thus, the inquiry proceeds by way of interrogating a specific entity, Dasein, in order to find out the meaning of Being, which is the very Being of the entity being interrogated and all other entities. With this structure in place, Heidegger establishes the twofold priority of the question of Being. First, it has ontological priority because it is the most fundamental of all questions. The sciences, for instance, operate within delimited regions of entities (biology studies life, physics studies matter), but they presuppose an unexamined understanding of what it means for these entities "to be." The question of Being thus undergirds every other possible inquiry. Second, Dasein has a distinct ontical priority. It is not an arbitrary starting point. Dasein is "ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it." Dasein’s very essence is to exist in such a way that its own Being matters to it. This reflexive structure makes Dasein the non-arbitrary starting point, it is the one being whose existence is the question. The clarity of this structure stands in stark contrast to the traditional dogmas that have prevented the question from ever being properly posed.

III

Deconstructing the Three Prejudices of Traditional Ontology

Heidegger's reawakening of the question of Being immediately confronts a formidable obstacle: a set of deeply entrenched prejudices that have rendered the question seemingly superfluous for centuries. These are not simple errors in reasoning but powerful dogmas, inherited primarily from the Greek formulation of the problem, which have sanctioned and perpetuated the forgetfulness of Being. To clear the ground for his own investigation, Heidegger must first deconstruct these three claims, showing how each one misinterprets the nature of Being and prematurely closes off the path of inquiry.

3.1 The Prejudice of Universality

The first dogma states that "Being is the most universal concept." This prejudice, stemming from Aristotelian logic, treats 'Being' as the highest genus, applicable to everything that is. If it applies to everything, the argument goes, then it is an empty abstraction that tells us nothing specific and therefore requires no further investigation. Heidegger's refutation is decisive. He argues that the "universality" of Being is not that of a genus. Being is "transcendental" not because it is a "highest genus," but because it crosses over (transcendens) and makes possible any and all generic classifications of entities. Being is not the most universal property of things; it is the condition for the possibility of entities appearing as entities at all. Therefore, its universality does not make it the emptiest of concepts but rather the most primordial and enigmatic one, demanding a unique mode of inquiry.

3.2 The Prejudice of Indefinability

The second prejudice asserts that "The concept of Being is indefinable." Traditional logic defines a concept by placing it within a higher genus and specifying its unique difference (per genus et differentiam). Since Being is not a genus, there is no higher genus under which it could be subsumed. It is, therefore, logically indefinable, and the tradition has taken this to mean that no further questions about its meaning can be asked.

Heidegger turns this argument on its head. He agrees that Being cannot be defined in the manner of an entity, but he argues that this "indefinability" does not permit us to dispense with the question of its meaning. On the contrary, it points directly to the uniqueness of the problem. To conclude from its indefinability that it requires no investigation is a profound philosophical error. The fact that Being does not behave like an entity is precisely what motivates the central question: what, then, is the meaning of Being?

3.3 The Prejudice of Self-Evidence

The third and perhaps most powerful prejudice is the claim that "Being is the most self-evident of all concepts." In every act of cognition, in every assertion, and in all our practical dealings with the world, we constantly make use of the verb 'is'. We understand implicitly what is meant when we say "the sky is blue" or "I am here." The tradition has taken this constant, untroubled usage as proof that the meaning of Being is perfectly clear and requires no special philosophical clarification. Heidegger counters that this apparent self-evidence masks a deep and fundamental incomprehensibility. Our pre-ontological understanding of Being is a fact, but it is a vague and average understanding. The constant use of 'is' does not signify clarity but rather an unthinking reliance on a meaning that has never been brought to light. As Heidegger states, "The fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness, is a fact which itself demonstrates the necessity of recapitulating the question of the meaning of ‘Being’". This supposed self-evidence is, for Heidegger, the primary symptom of the forgetfulness of Being. Having dismantled these prejudices, Heidegger can now establish his own methodological starting point: the analytic of Dasein.

IV

The Project of Destruction: A Critical Retrieval of History

To ensure that his own inquiry does not fall back into the very traps he has just exposed, Heidegger introduces the methodological necessity of a "destruction" (Destruktion) of the history of ontology. This provocative term does not imply a negative or nihilistic desire to annihilate the philosophical past. Instead, it signifies a critical process of dismantling or "loosening" (Auflockerung) the hardened, sedimented tradition of philosophy in order to retrieve the "primordial experiences" in which the first, and subsequently decisive, determinations of Being were achieved. The necessity of this Destruktion arises from an unavoidable fact: any attempt to ask the question of Being today is immediately and powerfully constrained by the conceptual language inherited from the Greek tradition, particularly from Plato and Aristotle. When we ask about "Being," we are already operating within a framework that tends to understand it in terms of substance, presence, permanence, and objectivity. This tradition, Heidegger argues, has passed down a distorted conception of Being, which has become so ingrained that it appears natural and inevitable. The task is not to discard this history but to critically engage with it to understand how and why the original question became obscured. The ultimate goal of this deconstructive process is to trace the tradition's core concepts back to their phenomenological sources. Heidegger's central claim is that Greek ontology, in its foundational moments, interpreted the Being of entities from a specific, theoretical stance: as "presence-at-hand". His is the mode of Being characteristic of static, objective things that we observe and theorize about. However, this interpretation arises from and covers over a more primordial mode of encounter: the practical, circumspective concern of dealing with equipment as "ready-to-hand". The Greek error was not in identifying presence-at-hand, but in taking this derivative, theoretical mode of Being as the primary and universal meaning of Being itself. This elevation of presence-at-hand effectively concealed the more fundamental ways Dasein is engaged in a world and understands Being. The Destruktion is therefore the indispensable historical critique that prepares the way for a truly fundamental ontology.

V

Conclusion: From Deconstruction to Fundamental Ontology

Martin Heidegger's project in Being and Time is revolutionary precisely because it begins by acknowledging the immense weight of history. His deconstruction of the history of ontology is not a prelude to his philosophy but an integral part of its method. By meticulously dismantling the three core prejudices, that Being is universal, indefinable, and self-evident, he demonstrates that the Western tradition has not been engaged in a continuous exploration of the question of Being but has, for the most part, been complicit in its neglect. The "destruction" of this history is thus a positive and productive act: a critical loosening of concepts to clear a path for a renewed, phenomenologically grounded inquiry into the meaning of Being, starting from an analysis of Dasein. By exposing the historical contingencies and philosophical biases that led to the "forgetfulness of Being," Heidegger fundamentally reshaped the task of philosophy. In making the question of Being once again the central and unavoidable problem for thought, Heidegger demonstrated that genuine philosophy must proceed not from a timeless, neutral standpoint, but from a historically-aware, phenomenological hermeneutic of the one being for whom Being is an issue: Dasein.